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unprecedented, efforts to impose a measure of logical rigour on legal concepts in general, whose influence has proved especially lasting in rights-theory; Honoré's writings on the concept of property are among his most significant contributions to an extensive range of topics in legal philosophy and general jurisprudence. I will discuss the relevance of both to my argument after briefly outlining what I take to be the bundle theory's key features.
Although now inextricably linked with Hohfeld and Honoré, the notion of property rights as comprising a "bundle of sticks" predates their work. 9 The bundle theory holds, at its most basic, that the "right" of a property-owner is separable into a series of component rightparts; my "ownership" of some chattel may comprise, inter alia, a right of exclusion, a right of use, a right of possession, and a right of alienation, none of which is conceptually dependent on any of the others. 10 The doctrine of estates in real property introduces further, more exotic interests; I may acquire the right of occupation in an apartment from you, perhaps supplemented by various easements and rights of access, though my right to alienate it may be restricted by the terms of the license. You may in turn have only a life interest in that apartment, with a reversion vesting in a relative upon your death. These arrangements are subject to revision over time in response to economic and social circumstances, and can thus vary substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with many local peculiarities developing. The common law envisages, for instance, such collective properly be grouped with the bundle theorists; at any rate, the bundle theorists who followed made extensive use of his schema. 9 The first known use of the term in this context is John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States 43 (Callaghan & Co. 1888); "The dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights." The first metaphorical reference to a bundle of sticks, however, is Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 129 (Columbia U. P., 1928); "The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not constant through the ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from time to time." 5 provisions as those of the Israeli kibbutznik and the American Hutterite; 11 if the property is Irish and the owner indebted, the High Court may encumber it with a "judgement mortgage". 12 The bundle theory regards these individual and separable rights, or "sticks", as having no substantive, essential connection to each other. To the extent that any two or more of them tend to accompany each other, their conjunction is contingent rather than intrinsic; from a logical point of view, we might as easily have tied any other combination of the possible interests in the chattel or property together in the bundle. In our ordinary commercial transactions, we can and do take these bundles apart, redistributing the sticks among others' bundles, and replacing them with new ones. 13 Who, then, is "the owner" of some particular piece of property? The question, for a bundle theorist, involves something like what Gilbert Ryle would have termed a "category error". 14 Since the number and kind of such interests in the property, all vested in different individuals, may be almost unlimited depending on the legal jurisdiction, it makes little intuitive sense to pick out any one interest-bearer as "the" owner. No particular interest or 11 See e.g. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land 102 Yale L.J. 1315 (1993) , at 1346-8. 12 See J.C.W. Wylie, Irish Land Law, 4 th ed. 867-884 (Bloomsbury Professional, 2010) . 13 In practice, the number and form of such fragmentations and redistributions permitted is limited by the so-called numerus clausus principle, principally as a result of the in rem nature of property rights that will play a large part in this discussion; see T.W. Merrill Rev. 1009 Rev. (2009 , at 1021-9. For a beguiling account of the complexities of property-right arrangements, however (and of the degree to which the lay public's understanding of their subtleties often outstrips that of legal specialists), cf. Robert C. Elickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1986) . As detailed below, there are also relations of logical entailment between e.g. duties and their correlative rights; we may regard these, however, as instances of the same stick viewed from different perspectives. 6 right, and moreover no particular combination of those interests and rights, is either necessary or sufficient to establish ownership. 15 "The lawyer, ..." as Jeremy Waldron notes, "will not be interested in finding out which of [the various parties] really counts as an owner.
His only concern is with the detailed contents of the various different bundles of legal relations." 16 Any unitary notion of "ownership", then, denoting a single canonical relation between person and property, seems to drop out of the legal picture altogether, surviving as a mere "folk-legal" concept in the discourse of laymen. Among the cognoscenti, even Ackerman's "dimmest law student" recognises that the term is at best an imprecise place-holder for what really matters -which individual bears the particular stick or sticks relevant to the legal dispute in question.
That, at any rate, is the essence of the bundle theory of property rights. "Property" and "ownership" are therefore amorphous or "shapeless" concepts, 17 failing to consistently pick out any determinate legal relation or set of legal relations. Rather, their extension changes from one occasion to the next; while everyday talk ascribes an essence or "core" content to the concepts of property and ownership, no such entity in fact exists. For the bundle theorist, then, the terms represent a sort of primitive hangover from outdated theories which legal science has now dispelled, in much the way that character-traits like courage and romance are still widely credited to the heart. 15 A fee simple interest with possession in land is widely considered to be the closest analogue to "absolute" ownership; nevertheless, even such an interest is subject to potential statutory restrictions on bequest, or to compulsory purchase by the state. See e.g. both the majority opinion by Brennan J and the dissent of Rehnquist J in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) .
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The theory has a distinguished philosophical lineage. It might not have been approved by Hume himself, but is certainly in the spirit of his injunction to "commit to the flames" as sophistry and illusion anything which was neither observable (like the sticks) nor knowable a priori. 18 Indeed, my claim is that it represents a special case of what David Lewis termed "Humean Supervenience", or "the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another." 19 That is to say, anything true we can say about the world ultimately reduces to statements about the distribution of perfectly natural properties and relations; there are no necessary connections between the individual perfectly natural properties and relations; and those perfectly natural properties and relations are the intrinsic properties of sub-atomic particles and the spatiotemporal relations between them.
"Supervenience", more generally, is a philosophers' term of art for a relation between sets of properties; A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if all differences in Aproperties must be accompanied by differences in B-properties. Thus, for instance, the brittleness of objects is said to supervene on their physical micro-structure; if one windowpane is more shatter-resistant than another, then the atoms composing the two must be differently arranged. Conversely, a different arrangement of atoms does not entail a different level of brittleness, and my coffee mug may be just as prone to shattering as either Rev. 611 (1988) . The justices, Singer argues, "wrongly defined the issue as a search for the 'owner' of the property. They then assumed that, in the absence of specific doctrinal exceptions to the contrary, owners are allowed to do whatever they want with their property" (at 621). To search for "the owner" when many parties have compelling interests, he argues, "is fundamentally wrong. It is simply not the right question. To assume that we can know who property owners are, and to assume that once we have identified them their rights follow as a matter of course, is to assume what needs to be decided" (p. 637-8) . Instead, the courts ought to "decide who wins the dispute on grounds of policy and morality, and then ... call that person the owner" (p. 638).
In metaphysical terms, the bundle theory is therefore like any Humean theory a naturalist, and an anti-essentialist, position. It is naturalist, insofar as it denies the existence of any further relation of "property" or "ownership" over and above the specific claim-rights; once these have been inventoried, there is nothing more the law needs to know. It is likewise anti-essentialist, because it denies that there is any particular "core" claim-right, or set of such rights, which determines how the concepts of "property" and "ownership" are to be applied. Depending on the variant, it may deny outright that any legal relation or group of such entities exists which corresponds to those concepts (an anti-realist bundle theory), or it may hold that numerous such relations or collections of them correspond to the concepts, which may be defined in any number of ways according to judicial convenience, and none of which possesses any special theoretical significance (a "promiscuous realist" bundle theory). 23 But for practical purposes, the difference between these variants is merely notational.
The greatest impetus to the bundle theory's popularity came from the work of Wesley
Hohfeld, who first demonstrated that the apparent unity of the property-and ownershiprelations in fact concealed a myriad of distinct legal relations, in particular claim-rights, Smith's view is that the "information costs" of keeping track of such a myriad of interpersonal relationships renders the Hohfeldian view radically impractical (see note 50, below), and that property therefore provides "a platform for the rest of private law" (at 1691) by simplifying these relationships as a much smaller and standardised number between persons and things. But the bundle theory, as Smith acknowledges (1605ff.), is an "analytical device", which aims at revealing the fundamental nature of property-relations and quotidian property-talk; that it is usually far more efficient to abbreviate the multitude of fundamental relations into the everyday vocabulary is not something that bundle-theorists commonly deny, any more than physicists will typically eschew talk of the ordinary physical objects and properties which they nevertheless hold to be analysable without remainder into arrangements of sub-atomic particles and their properties. A final significant feature worth noting in Hohfeld's analysis is the so-called "Correlativity Axiom", 30 which joins the concepts of claim-rights, privileges, powers, and immunities with their respective correlates of duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities.
The axiom states that there is a symmetrical relation of strict implication between each pair;
to take the most relevant and well-known example of rights and duties, my right of exclusive possession of an apartment strictly implies everybody else's corresponding duty to exclude themselves from it, and vice versa. 31 Since the correlation is axiomatic, it is nonsensical to see the right as arising from the duty, or the duty from the right, "(j)ust as a slope's downward direction is not prior or posterior to its upward direction -either logically or temporally." 32
The claim is not an empirical one; that every duty is owed to the holder of a right, and every possession in the eastern, but not the western, half). 35 Since the sticks are so infinitesimal, it is little wonder that theorists have written of the "disintegration" of property. 36
Penner's "Unified Concept"
So much for the bundle theory, as it has descended to us through Hohfeld and Honoré, and as I propose to defend it against the recent attacks. Why has its popularity declined so sharply in recent decades, to the point that recent theorists of property, in the course of outlining their own views, can regard it as abundantly refuted, and in no need of further discussion? 37 Even during its ascendancy, the contrary idea, of "an integrated notion of property existing prior to and informing the law," 38 remained attractive for a variety of reasons, including its congruence with laypersons' intuitions, and the purported ability "to explain the clear meaning and use of the term in theory and practice" 39 , as well as to ground wider arguments about the justice of particular distributions of property. In particular, such 35 Many cities, as I am grateful to an anonymous commentator for pointing out, have regulations that prohibit splitting city lots in two in this manner. There are, of course, excellent pragmatic reasons for regulations of this sort, which minimise the "information costs" imposed by excessively baroque, exotic, or fine-grained distributions of property-rights; some theorists (see note 50, below) have made these costs the basis of their opposition to the bundle theory. But according to the bundle theory, these are contingent, rather than essential connections between sticks, and there is nothing in the nature of property which determines that regulations must exist to link them in this way. a notion has been thought to provide a bulwark against "statist" confiscatory practices. 40 As previously stated, I don't propose to discuss the issues of distributive justice in the course of this paper. Rather, I will focus on the ways that the concepts of ownership and property are meant and used, according to some of the more influential critiques of the bundle theory, with the aim of exposing a number of misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the theory. What these alternative theories share, which the bundle theory denies, is the focus on some supposed "standard" relationship that an owner might have to a particular physical resource, which they take to be paradigmatic of property and ownership in general.
The first such view I want to consider is that of James Penner. In a lengthy (110 pages)
paper 41 and a subsequent monograph 42 he outlines both a critique of the bundle theory, and an alternative, "unified" concept of property, which rests on two main claims; the "Exclusion Thesis", and the "Separability Thesis." I will focus on the critical, rather than the positive, aspect of his theory; if his criticisms of the bundle theory prove unsuccessful, then the positive account loses both its motivation and many of its basic assumptions.
Penner's critique begins inauspiciously. "Hohfeld," he writes, "was mad for symmetry between rights and duties, and he based his notion of the correlativity of rights to duties on 
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aesthetic whim of Hohfeld's; it is, prima facie, a function of the very meaning of the terms. 44 So when Penner concedes that anybody believing in the correlativity of rights and duties is "pretty much bound to describe a right in rem as a multitude of rights in personam," 45 but reassures us that "(n)o one without a commitment to Hohfeld's views regarding symmetry need define correlativity in this way," 46 he owes us rather more than the expression of personal aesthetic preference for asymmetry, and rejection of the in rem-in personam reduction as implausible, that we are given. What we really need, and are nowhere given, is a wholly new account of the normal meaning of "right" and "duty", which establishes that they are independent, and unrelated, concepts.
Let us charitably suppose that some such definition of those terms is available, and acceptable. Why does Penner consider the equivalence of in rem and in personam rights to be implausible? The difference between the two which Hohfeld's analysis omits, he argues, is that for a right in personam -unlike a right in rem -it matters which particular person is the duty-bearer or the right-holder.
Consider the familiar Blackacre. "If A owns Blackacre," writes Penner, "then he may grant any number of rights in personam to specific or specifiable people to make use of it, walk across it, and so on. But it matters to A who they are, and it matters to them who A is." 47 A must know who they are in order to grant them the right, and they must know who A is and the scope of his rights in order to assess the content of their license. This is not an especially novel point. Indeed, it will be familiar to logicians and philosophers of language as a case of the de dicto/de re distinction. 49 Consider the phrase "the tallest boy in the class"; this picks out one determinate individual. But in semantic contexts such as belief-and desire-ascription or "modal" claims about possibility and necessity, termed "referentially opaque", such a phrase may be ambiguous. In the sentence "Mary wants to kiss the tallest boy in the class," the phrase may refer to that specific person, or it may function as a general description, which any number of others might have fulfilled in other circumstances. Suppose that Mary believes Henry to be the tallest boy; the sentence does not specify whether she wishes to kiss Henry in particular, or whichever boy happens to be tallest (perhaps she is mistaken, and Henry is in fact marginally shorter than Ben, who slouches). If it is Henry alone that she desires, the sentence should be interpreted de re, or as pertaining to the "thing" identified by the phrase; if instead she desires the tallest boy, regardless of who he may be, the sentence should be read de dicto, or as pertaining to the "words" of the phrase itself.
Something of this sort, I take it, is at the root of Penner's concern. If I am granted a license in personam to walk Blackacre by its owner, I must have the ability to identify him, and the phrase "the owner of Blackacre" should consequently be read de re. 
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Ockham's injunction that entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem 55 would serve perfectly as an epigram for the bundle theory, and its insistence that the phenomenon of property can be fully explained on the basis of the individual "sticks", without any appeal to a wider, all-encompassing relation of "property-ownership".
Penner, though he elsewhere explicitly divides his alternative account into an "exclusion thesis" and a "separability thesis," 56 states his view of property most succinctly thus;
The right to property is the right to determine the use or disposition of an alienable thing in so far as that can be achieved or aided by others excluding themselves from it, and includes the right to abandon it, to share it, to license it to others (either exclusively or not), and to give it to others in its entirety. 57
This certainly captures much of the intuitive force of the folk-legal concept of "property".
However, the attempt to shoe-horn various aspects of property-law into -and various other aspects of law out of -this concept of a "single, coherent right" 58 can only be described as tortuous. 59 The problem is not that Penner is unsuccessful in the two hundred or so pages 55 "Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
56 Penner, Idea of Property ch. 4-5. 57 Penner, The 'Bundle of Rights' Picture 742. 58 Id., at 754. 59 Here is the summary of just a single instance, from Penner, Idea of Property 131; "My submission about the proprietary character of choses in action, then, is that to the extent that we regard choses in action, these rights in personam, as property rights, we do so because of their relative 'personality poverty' in relation to other rights in personam. What makes these problematic property rights is the fact that while the relationship is humming along and parties are meeting their obligation, when banks are honouring their depositors; balances, dividends are paid, and debt payments are made on schedule, these rights fulfil very much the role of property that money does. When things go awry, however, when holders are apt to lose shareholder suits or actions against their debtors, the rights revert, in a sense, to their in personam origins." which the endeavour takes up. The problem, reminiscent of Thomas Kuhn's famous account of the Copernican Revolution, 60 is rather that such an extensive effort is necessary at all. As Kuhn describes, the Ptolemaic astronomers who predated Copernicus believed the sun and planets to orbit the Earth in "cycles" of perfectly circular form. As more and more accurate observations began to be made, however, it became necessary to postulate further circular oscillations around the cycles themselves -"epicycles" -to preserve the theory. By the time of Johannes Kepler, who first questioned the utility of the epicycles, the ad hoc patches which were necessary to support the geocentric/circular orbits theory had become absurdly complex. What distinguished the Copernican theory was not that he could make better and more accurate predictions, for he could not; rather, it was the fact that his theory did not number of discrete rights, should be neither surprising nor troubling. In outlining the bundle theory, I compared the rights not to "sticks" in a bundle, but to "atoms" of property; the Humean supervenience thesis to which I compared the bundle theory is specifically one about how our everyday talk about the world is ultimately dependent on, and reducible to, talk about the sub-atomic particles of modern physics. The number of such particles making up the world may indeed be mind-boggling; but no physicist supposes that the physical world therefore has the structure of cake and "can be sliced in any way we wish". But phrased this way, the incoherence of his position becomes clear; there is simply no formal difference at all between "anything" and "everything" in this context. In any imaginable calculus of rights, the two notions will be expressed by exactly the same universal quantifier; "For all rights x, A may exercise x, or grant it to B." Once again, Penner insists on an intuitive distinction premised on the existence of some special property or entity which exists over and above the elements into which it can be formally analysed without -in the mathematical sense -remainder.
The ultimate reason for clinging to this distinction, Penner calls the "uselessness thesis"; the bundle theory involves "at least the tacit admission, that the concept of 'property' is vague or undefinable, and so ... degenerate or useless." 67 If the theory is true, he reasons, the deflationary concept of "property" that it advances can add nothing to our understanding of property law or judicial decision-making. For Thomas Grey 68 , this means that the entire concept, though retaining some use at the "folk-legal" level, must ultimately be confused. On a more moderate view, like Barry Hoffmaster's, the concept is conclusory; "A statement of ownership is a conclusion drawn from comparing a particular combination of the incidents of ownership, existing together in a determinate situation, with the paradigm of ownership." 69 In other words, judges will make a decision in any given case on the basis of the particular rights and duties of the parties, and of the particular demands of justice in the the right to a market monopoly, akin to the protection generally provided by the monopolies of copyright or patent law?" 74 Such a "property right to a legally structured market position", he argues, makes more sense than "(j)amming rights to the news or to an idea into the mold of property rights." 75 Yet this characterisation of the conclusory view is plainly inaccurate, and still wedded to the idea of the property-concept as determinate. There is no need to "jam" such rights into a "mold"; the property-concept, according to the bundle theory, is "shapeless", and more akin to a blanket we may simply throw loosely over whatever considerations we wish it to cover. It is hard to argue, moreover, that Penner's "unified concept" of property has made judicial reasoning easier to predict if the "naive but accurate" 76 intuition he appeals to finds all three Supreme Court opinions in a landmark case confused.
In Moore, where the plaintiff sought to have his property rights recognised in cells excised from his body during surgery for leukaemia, which were later the subject of several patent lines, Penner's account is similarly at variance with actual judicial reasoning. Panelli J, writing for the majority, denied the claim in conversion, on the grounds that a relevant statute "eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot
simply assume that what is left amounts to 'property' or 'ownership'." 77 Yet Penner rejects both this and the other opinions by Mosk J -who explicitly invokes the bundle theory 78 -and Broussard and Arabian JJ for failing to consider the question whether "(e)ven if one can regard the control rights we have over our body parts as somewhat akin to 'ownership,' is there nothing more to be said before we treat something as intimately related to the human persona as one's body as property?" 79
The bundle-theorist's answer, and that adopted by each of the justices in Moore, is simply "no"; the facts of the case, and the particular bundle of sticks involved, provide a complete basis on which to reach the decision, and no concept merely supervening upon them need be invoked to explain the outcome. Penner thinks this entails "(t)he idea that some magic occurred on [Moore's spleen's] removal so that the researchers could claim a property right in it as if claiming something unowned the instant it left his body." 80 Once more, however, the criticism only works if one is wedded to a substantive concept of "property". If "a property right" is itself nothing magical, but merely the label we attach ex 76 Id., at 817. 
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post to any sub-bundle of the sticks sufficient to decide the case, then there is just nothing at all mysterious about that "right" transferring when certain of its constituent sticks do.
I leave the discussion of Penner with one final point, which appears to have gone unremarked in the subsequent literature. To sustain the "unified" concept of property in the admitted absence of necessary and sufficient conditions for its application, Penner overturns the entire standard field of "Classical" semantics, relying instead on an alternative view based on Jonathan Sutton's unpublished B.Phil. thesis. 81 I offer no opinion here on the merits of Prof. Sutton's "criterial" semantics, save to note that it has not yet displaced the mainstream view. To completely revise our understanding of linguistic meaning for the sole purpose of preserving a particular theoretical view of legal rights would surely be to break a butterfly upon the proverbial wheel. That Penner does so in the name of "a burden of proof argument, drawing on the intuition of Occam's razor" 82 is doubly curious.
Harris's "Minimal Structure"
The final anti-bundle argument I shall consider is that of Jim Harris. Harris's main work on the subject 83 is careful and detailed, but it can occasionally be difficult to identify a particular structure to the overall argument. Accordingly, I will deal with the main points in approximately the order he raises them. lessons that simply repeat the assertions made about his own intuitions in the course of describing the imaginary societies. Before long, the discussions will have "yielded the conclusion that the core idea of a property institution resides in the twinned conceptions of trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum." 91
If the elements of the "minimal structure" are of dubious provenance, the "sophisticated structures," 92 which Harris insists must be built upon it for the purposes of the full range of modern property-talk, are patently gerrymandered. Example after example is force-fitted in or out of the schema in the same epicyclical manner we saw in Penner, in openly vague and arbitrary fashion; "if one poses the question, who is the owner of this house or flat?, answers will refer only to those with leases of a substantial duration, although usage points to no particular cut-off point." 93 The result, he freely admits, "is a portmanteau category," 94 delineated only by "a stipulative boundary." 95
In defence of this position, Harris argues that in the absence of such a unified, albeit heterogeneous, concept, "we would have to regard as baleful" 96 the everyday claims of entitlement to particular items of social wealth. This may be the aim of some more radical critics of property, but there is no obvious reason why we cannot, per Thomas Grey, 97 leave the folk-concept intact for everyday use, and rest the actual legal claims of entitlement on the individual "sticks" themselves.
Harris defends his jury-rigged property concept against some of those radical critics by arguing that the property-scepticism of Alf Ross and Karl Olivecrona; 
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which its proponents will be concerned to rebut. The first of these again concerns the Correlativity Axiom, while the second decries the "conclusory view" of the role of the property concept in judicial decision-making as tautologous. Whether we consider this new stick to be created de novo by the decision ("judgemade") or to have been in force since the dawn of legal time, albeit never previously elaborated (the "pre-existence thesis") is for current purposes irrelevant. 113 The important question is why, according to Harris, we must interpret the decision as the assertion of a general principle of ownership which he admits to be subsequently decomposable into individual rights, rather than as the recognition of an additional right which contributes to our after-the-fact ownership-conclusions. Why, that is, must judicial reasoning be "top- down" from ownership to sticks, rather than "bottom-up"? 114 Certainly, given the heterogeneous and jury-rigged nature of the "portmanteau" top-down ownership-concept
Harris has outlined, he cannot commend it to us on the basis of legal certainty or theoretical elegance.
The supposed basis, then, which must apply equally in the case of closed-textured questions, is that of tautology; reasoning from a (newly-augmented) bundle of rights to a conclusion which merely restates the existence of that bundle would be both repetitious and,
Harris claims, uninformative. Repetitious it might well be; but tautologies are uninformative only if we do not already possess the information they express. Since the term "water" refers to H2O, the sentence "water is H2O" means "H2O is H2O"; but the discovery of water's chemical make-up was no uninteresting triviality. 115 Similarly, even if we regard the decisions in Bradford v. Pickles, or International News Service, or Moore, as formally tautologous, they nevertheless express interesting, and decidedly consequential, discoveries about the extent and distribution of the proprietary interests assertible under the common law.
Conclusion
I have offered a defence and, I hope, a clarification of the bundle theory. I want to summarise here briefly why I think that it is the only successful, and the most theoretically attractive, account of property rights available to us.
The major innovation of my position, the feature that is most likely to come as a surprise to anyone already familiar with at least the text-book or lecture-hall accounts of the bundle theory, will be the number and minuscule scope of the individual rights which compose a typical bundle. The classic theoretical justification of the bundle theory, I have argued, applied in a thoroughgoing manner, does not merely require us to consider separately the different "incidents" of ownership identified by Honoré, separately indexed to 114 Cf. Munzer, "Property and Disagreement", n.43 & ff. 115 Cf. Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of 'Meaning', 7 Minnesota Stud. Phil. Sci. 131 (1975) .
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-as Hohfeld pointed out -each potential right-holder and duty-bearer. That quantity of rights already strains the "bundle of sticks" metaphor to the limits; such a number of sticks would be less a bundle than a lumber-yard.
As I contend, we need to go further; each of those sticks is decomposable not just into the all the separate spatial parts in which interests could be conveyed to others, but also into all the separate temporal parts indicating the limited durations for which an interest can be conveyed. The numbers are now well beyond even lumber-yard quantities; they are in a literal sense astronomical. It is just that multitudinous character that offended Penner, yet I believe it actually assists us in understanding the bundle theory by providing the new metaphor that several theorists have recently called for; 116 the individual rights may be best thought of not as "sticks", but as "atoms". To that end I have drawn on an influential theory from the metaphysics of science -David Lewis' "Humean supervenience" -to illustrate the relation the individual rights have, both to each other and to the judicial decisions and everyday property-talk for which they provide the whole and unique basis.
When we get this metaphor clear, just like the older "bundle" metaphor, we see two reasons to prefer the deflationary theory it expresses to the accounts of property which rely on the existence of some entity over and above the individual "sticks" or "atoms". The first is that, since the individual rights can give a complete account of property-talk, invoking anything further is superfluous and inelegant; entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. The second is that, in fact, no such further entity has been observed "in the 
